Collective Choice Theory
The course Collective Choice Theory focuses on the application of economics to political science. In particular, we will apply different economic methodology such as rational choice and game theory to the study of systems and institutions for making collective choices. For this purpose we will introduce various methods of aggregating preferences of members of a given society into some social or collective preference. In-depth attention will be given to areas such as decision making in committees, legislative bargaining, design of elections and the analysis of voting power.
The course is taught in English and lectures and exercise classes alternate loosely (20 units in total). The exam will be posed in English (questions can, however, be answered in either English or German). If less than 5 participants register for a written exam, an oral examination may be held instead of the written exam.
The course Collective Choice Theory gives 6 credit points in:
- MSc Economics: “Spezialisierung: Modelltheorie” (as Mikroökonomik für Fortgeschrittene II)
- MSc Economics & MA IWG: “Spezialisierung: Governance” (as Governance, Wettbewerb & gesellschaftliche Entwicklung)
- MA IWG: “Spezialisierung: Ökonomische Modellbildung und empirische Analyse” (as Mikroökonomik für Fortgeschrittene II)
- MA IWG: “Spezialisierung: Governance & Public Management” (as Governance & Politik)
- MA P&E: “Modul C2 – Economics Electives”
Tentative schedule:
1. Introduction
2. History and short recap of decision theory
3. Collective choice with two alternatives
4. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
5. Domain restrictions
6. The spatial voting model
7. Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
8. Voting rules
9. Power indices
10. Axiomatic bargaining theory
Recommended textbooks:
- Gärtner, Wulf (2009). A Primer in Social Choice Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nurmi, Hannu (2006). Models of Political Economy. London and New York: Routledge.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, Ch. 21-23.