



## Seminar “Political Economy” (WS 2018/19)

The seminar is targeted at 16 students of *Economics* (Bachelor & Master), *Internationale Wirtschaft & Governance*, and *Philosophy & Economics* (Bachelor & Master), who are interested in the application of economic reasoning to the analysis of politics.

The seminar language will be English. All presentations will be blocked on Friday, January 18, and Saturday, January 19, 2019. The presentations must be submitted until January 13, 2019.

Seminar papers can be written in either English or German. Their lengths should be 4000-5000 words (Bachelor) respectively 5500-6500 words (Master) depending on the ratio of formal to verbal parts. Seminar papers must be handed in until March 31, 2019. Please note that deadlines are final and will be strictly enforced.

The seminar gives credit points in:

- Bachelor Economics: *Mikrotheoretisches Seminar* (Modelltheoretische Vertiefung), *Seminar zu Institutionen und Governance* (Institutionen und Governance)
- Master Economics: *Governance, Wettbewerb und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung* (Governance), *Individueller Schwerpunkt* [selected topics can also give credits for *Advanced Microeconomics II* (Modelltheorie)]
- Master IWG: *Governance & „Politik“* (Governance & Public Management), *Individuelle Spezialisierung* [selected topics can also give credits for *Advanced Microeconomics II* (Ökonomische Modellbildung und empirische Analyse)]
- Bachelor P&E: *Vertiefung Economics* (Economics)
- Master P&E: *Economics Elective* (Specialization)

A short introduction to the available topics (see the list below) will be given on Wednesday, July 25, 2018 at 14:00h in room S 55. Students who want to register for the seminar can do so with an e-mail to [alexander.mayer@uni-bayreuth.de](mailto:alexander.mayer@uni-bayreuth.de) until September 30, 2018. In the mail please give the following information in a comma-delimited list without spaces between commas and without any further details (such as “Dear Mr. Mayer” etc.) exactly as follows:

Last name,First name,Mat-Nr.,Degree,Semester,Pref1,Pref2,Pref3

### Key

Degree = Econ, IWG, P&E

Semester = Your semester in WiSe 18/19 (e.g., MA2 for your 2<sup>nd</sup> master semester)

Pref = your preferred topic

### Example

Arrow,Kenneth,1234567,Econ,BA5,4,12,6

Admission to the seminar is based on “first come, first serve”. You will be notified about acceptance (and your topic) directly after registration.

### Topics and literate recommendations

No.	Topic	Key literature recommendation
<b>I. Social Choice</b>		
1	Social Choice Rules and the US Civil War	Gaertner, W. (2006). <i>A Primer in Social Choice Theory</i> , Ch. 6, Oxford University Press.  Tabarrok, A. und L. Spector (1999). Would the Borda Count Have Avoided the Civil War? <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> 11, 261-288.
2	Arrow's Impossibility Theorem	Arrow, K.J. (1951, 1963). <i>Social Choice and Individual Values</i> , Ch. 5, John Wiley.  Gaertner, W. (2006). <i>A Primer in Social Choice Theory</i> , Ch. 2, Oxford University Press.
3	The Manipulability of Voting Rules: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem	Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. <i>Econometrica</i> 41, 587-602.  Sattthertwhaite, M.A. (1975). Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> 10, 187-217.  Gaertner, W. (2006). <i>A Primer in Social Choice Theory</i> , Ch. 5, Oxford University Press.
4	The Manipulability of Voting Rules: Are Voters Really Strategic?	Kube, S. and C. Puppe (2009). (When and How) Do Voters Try to Manipulate? <i>Public Choice</i> 139, 39-52.  Nurmi, H. (2016). Reflections on the Significance of Misrepresenting Preferences. In: N.T. Nguyen, R. Kowalczyk, J. Mercik (Eds.), <i>Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII</i> , Springer, 149-161.
<b>II. Optimal Decision Rules</b>		
5	Decision Rules under Different Ideals of Justice	Apestegua, J., Ballester, M.A. and R. Ferrer (2011). On the Justice of Decision Rules. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> 78, 1-16.
6	Utilitarian Decision Rules	Barberà, S. and M. Jackson (2006). On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> 114, 317-339.
7	Democratic Rules	Kurz, S., Maaser, N. and S. Napel (2017). On the Democratic Weights of Nations. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> 125, 1599-1634.
8	Optimal Decision Rules in International Organizations	Maggi, G. and M. Morelli (2006). Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations. <i>American Economic Review</i> 96, 1137-1158.

<b>III. Political Representation</b>		
9	Representation of Minority Interests	<p>Gerber, E.R., Morton, R.B. and T.A. Rietz (1998). Minority Representation in Multimember Districts. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 92, 127-244.</p> <p>Alesina, A., Aghion, P. and F. Trebbi (2008). Electoral Rules and Minority Representation in U.S. Cities. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> 123, 325-357.</p>
10	Democracy and Redistribution	<p>Meltzer, A.H. und S.F. Richard (1981). A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> 89, 917-927.</p> <p>Larcinese, V. (2007). Voting over Redistribution and the Size of the Welfare State: The Role of Turnout. <i>Political Studies</i> 55, 568-585.</p>
11	Democratization	<p>Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico (2004): Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope Of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age Of Reform". <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> 119, 707-765.</p> <p>Abrams, B.A. und R.F. Settle (1999). Women's Suffrage and the Growth of the Welfare State. <i>Public Choice</i> 100, 289-300.</p>
12	Distributional Consequences of Unequal Representation	<p>Knight, B. (2008). Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress. <i>Economic Journal</i> 118, 1785-1803.</p> <p>Snyder, J., Ting, M. und S. Ansolabehere (2005). Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting. <i>American Economic Review</i> 95, 981-1004.</p>
<b>IV. Political Competition</b>		
13	Electoral Systems and Public Spending	<p>Rickard, S. (2009). Strategic Targeting: The Effect of Institutions and Interests on Distributive Transfers. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i> 42, 670-695.</p> <p>Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., Perotti, R. und M. Rostagno (2002). Electoral Systems and Public Spending. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> 117, 609-657.</p>
14	Campaign Advertising	<p>Potters, J., R. Sloof, and F. van Winden (1997). Campaign Expenditures, Contributions and Direct Endorsements: The Strategic Use of Information and Money to Influence Voter Behavior. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> 13, 1-31.</p> <p>Houser, D., Ludwig, S. and T. Stratmann (2016). Deception and Political Participation: Theory and Laboratory Evidence. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> 54, 464-484.</p>
15	Electoral Rules and Economic Policies	<p>Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico (2001). The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives. <i>American Economic Review</i> 91, 225-239.</p> <p>Gagliarducci, S., Nannicini, T. und P. Naticchioni (2011). Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test. <i>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</i> 3, 144-174.</p>

16	Polarization	<p>Alesina, A., Baqir, R. and W. Easterly (1999). Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> 114, 1243-1284.</p> <p>Svensson, J. (2005). Controlling Spending: Electoral Competition, Polarization and Endogenous Platforms. Working Paper.</p>
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