



Seminar Political Economy WS 2019/20: Voting and Political Decisions in Practice

Objective and Target Group

The seminar is targeted at Master's students* of *Economics, Internationale Wirtschaft & Governance*, and *Philosophy & Economics*, who are interested in the application of economic reasoning to the analysis of political decisions. The purpose of the seminar is to give you both a sense of the frontier research topics and a good command of the tools used in the area.

* Advanced (and motivated Bachelor's students) may also be admitted upon request.

Dates and Deadlines

A short introduction to the available topics (see the list below) will be given on Friday, July 26, 2019 at 14:00 s.t. in room S 46.

All presentations will be blocked on Friday, January 24, and Saturday, January 25, 2020. The presentations must be submitted until January 17, 2020. Seminar papers must be handed in until March 31, 2020. Please note that deadlines are final and will be strictly enforced.

Assessment

Presentation, comment, participation and seminar paper (5500-6500 words depending on the ratio of formal to verbal parts). The latter should be on a well-defined issue related to your topic.

The seminar gives credit points in:

- Master Economics: *Governance, Wettbewerb und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung* (Governance), *Individueller Schwerpunkt* [selected topics can also give credits for *Advanced Microeconomics II* (Modelltheorie)]
- Master IWG: *Governance & „Politik“* (Governance & Public Management), *Individuelle Spezialisierung* [selected topics can also give credits for *Advanced Microeconomics II* (Ökonomische Modellbildung und empirische Analyse)]
- Master P&E: *Economics Elective* (Specialization)

Seminar Instructions

- The seminar language will be English.
- Time allowed: 45 min. presentation, 5 min. comment, 10 min. discussion.
- Presentations should be a comprehensive overview of the topic.
- Each presentation will be assigned to one other participant, who is to comment on (and initiate the discussion of) the contents of the presentation. Presenters are required to send their presentations to both lecturers and the respective commenters until January 17, 2020.
- The literature given below is a starting point for your presentation and seminar paper. You are typically expected to find additional material yourself.

Registration

Students who want to register for the seminar can do so with an e-mail to alexander.mayer@uni-bayreuth.de until September 30, 2019. In the mail please give the following information in a comma-delimited list without spaces between commas and without any further details (such as “Dear Mr. Mayer” etc.) exactly as follows:

Last name,First name,Mat-Nr.,Degree,Semester,Pref1,Pref2,Pref3

Key

Degree = Econ, IWG, P&E

Semester = Your semester in WS 19/20 (e.g., MA2 for your 2nd master semester)

Pref = your preferred topic

Example

Arrow,Kenneth,1234567,Econ,MA3,4,12,6

Admission to the seminar is based on “first come, first serve”. You will be notified about acceptance (and your topic) directly after registration.

Topics

Why Do Voters Vote?

T1. Pivotal Voting

- Palfrey T. R. and H. Rosenthal (1985). *Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty*. American Political Science Review 79 (1), 62-78.
- Börgers, T. (2004). *Costly Voting*. American Economic Review 94 (1), 57-66.
- Coate, S., M. Conlin and A. Moro (2008). *The Performance of Pivotal-Voter Models in Small-Scale Elections: Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda*. Journal of Public Economics 92 (3-4), 582-596.

T2. Norm Based Voting

- Gerber, A. S., D. P. Green and C. W. Larimer (2008). *Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment*. American Political Science Review 102 (1), 33-48.
- Feddersen, T. and A. Sandroni (2006). *A Theory of Participation in Elections*. American Economic Review 96 (4), 1271-1282.
- DellaVigna, S., J. List, U. Malmendier and G. Rao (2017). *Voting to Tell Others*. Review of Economic Studies 84 (1), 143-181.

How Do Voters Vote?

T3. Are Voters Strategic? Theory

- Piketty, T. (2000). *Voting as Communicating*. Review of Economic Studies 67 (1), 169-191.
- Bouton, L. (2013). *A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections*. American Economic Review 103 (4), 1248-1288.

T4. Are Voters Strategic? Empirics

- Pons, V. and C. Tricaud (2018). *Expressive Voting and Its Cost: Evidence from Runoffs With Two or Three Candidates*. Econometrica 86 (5), 1621-1649.
- Spenkuch, J. L. (2018). *Expressive vs. Pivotal Voters: An Empirical Assessment*. Journal of Public Economics 165, 73-81.

T5. The Role of Information

- Snyder, J. M. and D. Strömberg (2010). *Press Coverage and Political Accountability*. *Journal of Political Economy* 118 (2), 355-408.
- Nordin, M. (2014). *Do Voters Vote in Line with their Policy Preferences? —The Role of Information*. *CESifo Economic Studies* 60 (4), 681-721.

T6. How Does Corruption Influence Voting Behavior?

- Pani, M. (2011). *Hold Your Nose and Vote: Corruption and Public Decisions in a Representative Democracy*. *Public Choice* 148 (1-2), 163-196.
- Krause, S. and F. Méndez (2009). *Corruption and Elections: An Empirical Study for a Cross-Section of Countries*. *Economics & Politics* 21 (2), 179-200.

Do Policies Reflect Voter Preferences?

T7. Do Policies Converge to the Center?

- Gerber E. and J. Lewis (2004). *Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation*. *Journal of Political Economy* 112 (6), 1364-1383.
- Alesina, A. (1988). *Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters*. *American Economic Review* 78 (4), 796-805.

T8. The Effect of Extending the Voting Franchise

- Husted, T. A. and L. W. Kenny (1997). *The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government*. *Journal of Political Economy* 105 (1), 54-82.
- Miller, G. (2008). *Women's Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History*. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123 (3), 1287-1327.

T9. The Role of the Voting Technology

- Card, D. and E. Moretti (2007). *Does Voting Technology Affect Election Outcomes? Touch-Screen Voting and the 2004 Presidential Election*. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 89 (4), 660-673.
- Fujiwara, T. (2015). *Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil*. *Econometrica* 83 (2), 423-464.