

Consensus and Group Judgments: Perspectives from Philosophy and Economics

Seminar SoSe 2019

LECTURERS

Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel

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OBJECTIVE

Attitudes like beliefs and preferences are routinely attributed to groups. A jury can be said to believe the accused to be guilty, or a professional board can officially voice its disapproval of certain practices by its members. There are two main paradigms in philosophy and economics on the formation of such collective attitudes: the deliberative and the aggregative views. On the deliberative view, group attitudes stem from a consensus reached after a structured exchange of opinions. On the aggregative view, group attitudes are formed by putting together the possibly diverging views of individuals, through a formal voting procedure for instance.

The aim of this seminar is threefold. First, the students will understand the respective importance of the deliberative and the aggregative view in the broader philosophical landscape, and especially in political philosophy and in epistemology. Second, they will gain familiarity with various mathematical and economic models of, and results about deliberation and aggregation. Finally, they will be able to assess the philosophical significances of these models and results for our understanding of collective attitudes.

TARGET GROUP

Advanced Bachelor's students – and for selected topics also Master's students – from:

- Philosophy & Economics
- Economics
- Internationale Wirtschaft & Entwicklung / Governance

SEMINAR PLACES

- 16

LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION/ASSESSMENT

- Seminar: English
- Written work: English

DATES AND DEADLINES

- Introduction and Organization Sessions: **April 26th, 2019, 10:00 c.t., Room TBA.**
- Seminar: **June 28th to 30st, 2019.**
- Submission of seminar papers: **September 30th, 2019.**

Deadlines are final and will be strictly enforced.

ASSESSMENT

Philosophy & Economics:

- V seminar 6 cp: presentation, comment, participation + 4000-5000 word seminar paper.
- P6.iv seminar 5 cp: presentation, comment, participation + 3500-4500 word seminar paper. Note that in assigning seminar places priority will be given to the students registered for a V-seminar.
- (P4* and P3 in old PO) seminar 2 cp: presentation, comment, participation.
- (P3 in old PO) seminar 6 cp: presentation, comment, participation + 4000-5000 word seminar paper.
- (Old PO) V seminar 8 cp: same as 2 cp + 5000-6000 word seminar paper

Economics, IWE/IWG:

- BSc Hauptseminar 5 cp: presentation, comment, participation, 3500–4500 word seminar paper. [Credits in Individueller Schwerpunkt or as GVWL II 5/6.]
- MSc Hauptseminar 6 cp: presentation, comment, participation, 4000–5000 word seminar paper. [Credits in Individueller Schwerpunkt.]

ENROLMENT/REGISTRATION:

The registration proceeds in two steps.

1. Course Registration on CampusOnline. You will then be automatically be placed on the “waiting list” for the course.
2. Topic selection by contact with the lecturers (Napel and Roy).
Topics will be allocated on a **first-come-first-served** basis.

Registration is only complete when the topic has been agreed on and you have been assigned a place on CampusOnline. Deadline for complete registration: **June 15th, 2019, 12pm.**

SEMINAR INSTRUCTIONS

1. Time allowed: presentation of 45 min., comment of 5 min, discussion of 30 mins.
2. Presentations should be a concise and systematic overview of the topic in the form of a “teaching lecture”.
3. Each presentation will be assigned to one other participant, who is to comment on / initiate the discussion of the contents of the presentation. Presenters are required to send their presentations to both instructors and the respective commenters at least **seven** days before the seminar session.
4. The literature given below is a *starting point* for your lecture. You are typically expected to find additional material yourself.
5. Your presentation should be fully ready at the beginning of the seminar. In case of last-minute changes of schedule you might be asked to present earlier than announced.

SEMINAR PAPERS

Your *seminar paper* should be on a well-defined issue related to your presentation topic.

Please make sure when writing your paper that you maintain scholarly standards of presentation and citation. For guidance, please consult any of the research papers that can be found on either of our web sites. We recommend that you use the author-date (Harvard) referencing system.

THEMES

M = Mandatory reading for *all* seminar participants.

P = Philosophical paper.

E = Econ/tech paper.

* = Advanced paper.

T1. Deliberation and consensus: goals, aims, pitfalls.

(M,P) Dryzek, John S., and Christian List (2003), "Social choice theory and deliberative democracy: a reconciliation", *British Journal of Political Science* 33, 1-28.

(M,P) Elster, Jon (1997), "The market and the forum: three varieties of political theory", in *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, pp. 3-34.

(P) Hansen, Pelle G. and Vincent F. Hendricks (2014), *Infostorms*, Springer, chap. 2.

(P) List, Christian, Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin, and Ian McLean (2013), "Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls", *Journal of Politics* 75, 80-95

(E/P) Riker, William H. (1982), *Liberalism against Populism - A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*, Waveland Press; chap. 1, 5, and 10.

T2. Models of Deliberation and Consensus

(M, E) Aumann, Robert J. (1976), "Agreeing to Disagree", *Annals of Statistics* 4, 1236-1239.

(E*) Austen-Smith, David, and Timothy J. Feddersen, (2006), "Deliberation, preference uncertainty, and voting rules." *American Political Science Review* 100, 209-217.

(E) Geanakoplos, John D., and Heraklis M. Polemarchakis (1982), "We Can't Disagree Forever", *Journal of Economic Theory* 28, 192-200.

(P) List, Christian (2011), "Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result", *Journal of Political Philosophy* 19, 1-27.

(P*) Stewart, R. and Nielsen, M. (2019), "Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence", *British Journal for Philosophy of Science*, forthcoming.

(E*) Ottaviani, Marco, and Peter Sorensen, (2001), "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?", *Journal of Public Economics* 81, 393-422.

T3. DeGroot Model of Consensus Formation

(E*) Aczél, Janos., Che Tat Ng and Carl Wagner (1984), "Aggregation Theorems for Allocation Problems", *SIAM Journal on Algebraic and Discrete Methods* 5, 1-8.

(P) Bradley, Richard (2006), "Taking Advantage of Difference in Opinion", *Episteme* 3, 141-155.

(P) Bradley, Richard, (2007), "Reaching a consensus", *Social Choice and Welfare* 29, 609-632.

(P) Hartmann, Stephan, Carlo Martini and Jan Sprenger (2009), "Consensual Decision Making Among Epistemic Peers", *Episteme* 6, 110-129.

(M, P) Lehrer, Keith, and Carl Wagner (1981), *Rational Consensus in Science and Society*, Reidel, part 1.

(P*) Romeijn, Jan-Willem, and Roy, Olivier (2019), "They all agreed: Aumann meets DeGroot", *Theory and Decision*, forthcoming.

(P) Steele, Katie (2012), "Testimony as Evidence: More Problems for Linear Pooling", *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 41, 983-999.

T4. Models of Aggregation

(E*) Bozbay, Irem, Franz Dietrich and Hans Peters (2014), "Judgment aggregation in search for the truth", *Games and Economic Behavior* 87, 571-590.

(E) Dietrich, Franz (2006), "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems", *Journal of Economic Theory* 126, 286-298.

(E*) Dietrich, Franz (2014), "Scoring rules for judgment aggregation", *Social Choice and Welfare* 42, 873-911.

(M, E) Gaertner, Wulf (2003), *A Primer in Social Choice Theory*, Oxford UP, chap. 2 and 5.

(E*) Dietrich, Franz and Christian List (2007), "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation", *Economics and Philosophy* 23, 269-300.

(M, P) List, Christian and Philip Pettit (2002), "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result", *Economics and Philosophy* 18, 89-110.

(P) Williamson, Jon (2009), "Aggregating judgements by merging evidence", *Journal of Logic and Computation* 19, 461-473.

T5. Wisdom of crowds

(E) Young, H. Peyton (1995), "Optimal voting rules", *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9, 51-64.

(M, P) Cohen, Joshua (1986), "An Epistemic Conception of Democracy", *Ethics* 9, 26-38.

(P) Estlund, David (1997), "Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority", in James Bohman and William Rehg (eds.), *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, MIT Press, pp. 173-204.

(E) Feddersen, Timothy and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1998), "Convicting the innocent: the inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting", *American Political Science Review* 92, 23-35.

(E*) Lindner, Ines (2008), "A generalization of Condorcet's Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small players", *Economic Theory* 35, 607-611.

(P) List, Christian and Robert E., Goodin (2001), "Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem", *Journal of Political Philosophy* 9, 277-306.

(P) Dietrich, Franz and Kai Spiekermann (2013), "Independent opinions? On the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems", *Mind* 122, 655-685.

(E*) Pivato, Marcus (2016), "Epistemic Democracy with Correlated Voters", Mimeo, Université de Cergy-Pontoise.