Hauptseminar/V-Seminar SoSe 2016

Emergence and Dynamics of Conventions and Social Norms

LECTURERS
Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel
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OBJECTIVE
Can moral norms evolve out of selfish or “self-interested” behavior? Can individually rational agents learn to cooperate with each other? How do social norms like fashion or driving directions come about? How and when are they sustained? Can creatures without language learn to communicate and attribute meaning to utterances? The goal of this block seminar is to study seminal contributions, at the intersection of economic modelling and philosophical enquiry, that try to answer these questions. At the end of the seminar the student will be familiar with a number of models of evolution of cooperative behavior, social norms, social preferences and language in games.

TARGET GROUP
Advanced Bachelor’s students – and for selected topics also Master’s students – from:
- Philosophy & Economics
- Economics
- Internationale Wirtschaft & Entwicklung

SEMINAR PLACES
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LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION/ASSESSMENT
- Seminar: English
- Written work: English

DATES AND DEADLINES
- Introduction and Organization Sessions: January 29th, 2016, 12 noon (c.t.), room S 52 (RW 2) and April 15th, 2016, TBA pm (c.t.),
- Registration: April 15th, 2015, at the latest. Early registrations are possible after January’s Introduction and Organization Session. Places and topics will be allocated on a first-come-first-served basis.
- Seminar: May 27th to 29th, 2016.
- Submission of seminar papers: September 30th, 2016.
Deadlines are final and will be strictly enforced.

ASSESSMENT
- BA V or P3 seminar 2 cp: presentation, comment, participation
- BA V seminar 8 cp: same as 2 cp + 5000-6000 word seminar paper
- BA P3 seminar 6 cp: same as 2 cp + 4000-5000 word seminar paper.
- MA: elective seminar

_Economics, IWE_
- BSc Hauptseminar 5 cp: presentation, comment, participation, 3500–4500 word seminar paper. [Credits in Individueller Schwerpunkt or as GVWL II 5/6.]
- MSc Hauptseminar 6 cp: presentation, comment, participation, 4000–5000 word seminar paper. [Credits in Individueller Schwerpunkt.]

**ENROLMENT/REGISTRATION:**
Please enroll directly on the e-learning platform:
https://elearning.uni-bayreuth.de/course/view.php?id=13772

**SEMINAR INSTRUCTIONS**
1. Time allowed: presentation of 45 min., comment of 5 min, discussion of 30 mins.
2. Presentations should be a concise and systematic overview of the topic in the form of a “teaching lecture”.
3. Each presentation will be assigned to one other participant, who is to comment on / initiate the discussion of the contents of the presentation. Presenters are requested to send their presentations to us and the respective commenters at least three days before the seminar session.
4. The literature given below is a starting point for your lecture. You are typically expected to find additional material yourself.

**SEMINAR PAPERS**

Your _seminar paper_ should be on a well-defined issue related to your presentation topic.

Please make sure when writing your paper that you maintain scholarly standards of presentation and citation. For guidance, please consult any of the research papers that can be found on either of our web sites. We recommend that you use the author-date (Harvard) referencing system.

**THEMES**

T1. **Emergence of Economic Standards.**


T2. **Conventions in Simple Coordination Problems.**

Michihiro Kandori, George Mailath and Rafael Rob (1993), ”Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games”, *Econometrica* 61(1), 29-56.


**T3. Evolution of Language.**


**T4. Conventions and Norms in Bargaining Problems.**


Stefan Napel (2003), ”Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame”, *Games and Economic Behavior* 43(1), 86-106.


**T5. Evolution of Cooperation and Morality.**


**T6. Evolution of Social Preferences.**


**Additional references on modeling tools:**

*Static analysis of the evolution of strategies:*

*Dynamic analysis of the evolution of strategies:*

*Learning dynamics and stochastic stability:*

*Consensus formation and (anti-)coordination games on network structures:*